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Approved For Release 2002/01/09 : CIA-RDP74-00390R000200030004-9

W/Document Receipt

18 May 1970

Major General Kenneth G. Wickham
The Adjutant General
Department of the Army
Washington, D. C. 20315

***ARMY review
completed***

Dear General Wickham:

The attached six pages of notes received with your request
AGAR-S(9518)/1 dated 27 March 1970 have been reviewed.

This Agency has no objection to the declassification
and release of these documents to Mrs. Lynn E. Davis to be
used for the purposes specified in your request.

Sincerely,



CIA Records Administration Officer

Attachments:

A 6 Pages of Notes;
#000055, 56, 96, 100,
103 and 137

Distribution:

Orig & 1 - Addressee
1 - OSS File ✓

25X1A

DPS/SSS/RAB/[REDACTED]:fms (18 May 70)

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Approved For Release 2002/01/09 : CIA-RDP74-00390R000200030004-9

SECRET

11 May 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR: [REDACTED]

STATINTL

SUBJECT : Request from The Adjutant General's
Office for Declassification of OSS
Documents

REFERENCE : AGAR-S(9518)/1

1. Returned herewith are the documents from the Department of the Army which they have requested to be reviewed to determine if they can now be declassified.

2. The Office of Security and the CI Staff have no objections to the declassification of such documents. The CI Staff has raised the question on the suitability of obtaining concurrence from the Department of State. The Strategic Services Unit, nonetheless, authorizes you to advise the Department of the Army that the documents may be declassified and used for the purposes specified in their memorandum.

STATINTL

[REDACTED]

Encls. a/s

STATINTL

16

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director, Strategic Services Unit
SUBJECT : Declassification of OSS documents

The Adjutant General's Office proposes to declassify the attached notes taken by Mrs. Lynn E. Davis from OSS originated documents if there are no objections from this Agency. May I have your concurrence and comments.

for
Chief, Support Services Staff

STATINTL

Attachments:

6 pages of notes;
#000055, 56, 96, 100,
103 and 137,

DA Memorandum 340-3 (U)

Distribution:

Orig. and 1 Addressee
1 SSS Subject
1 SSS Chrono
1 RAB Subject ✓ (OSS)

DDS/SSS/RAB/ [redacted] af (14 Apr 70)

STATINTL



DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20315

AGAR-S (9518)/1

27 MAR 1970

25X1A

Records Administration Officer
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D. C., 20505

25X1A

Mrs. Lynn E. Davis, cleared for access to classified Army-originated files under the provisions of DA Memorandum 340-3 (copy attached), is making a study of "U.S. Foreign Policy Toward Eastern Europe, 1941-45," the topic of her PhD. dissertation at Columbia University.

Mrs. Davis has taken a number of notes from files of the former Operations Division (OPD), WDGS, which were submitted to this office for review for possible declassification by the records custodian. Six pages of the notes are from OSS-originated documents found in the OPD files. They are attached.

This office has reviewed these 6 pages and there are no Army objections to their declassification and release. However, no action will be taken without your concurrence.

Request your review and comment. If notes cannot be declassified, they will be retained in this office as Group-3 material.

Sincerely,

Cyrus H. Fraker

for JACK L. GUTHRIE
Acting Chief Office Management Division

Inclosures

6 pages of notes;
#000055, 56, 96, 100,
103 and 137, SECRET

DA Memorandum 340-3 (U)

9518

Secret

OPD

Memorandum/Report

OPD 336 Yugoslavia Sec 1

July 8 1944

General Marshall

William Donovan Dir. OSS

Report one officers with Tito's command - 6 months

... "The situation in Yugoslavia has, from the beginning, been terribly confusing, and almost beyond the comprehension of an impartial outside observer. The deep rooted causes of the internecine strife are contained in racial, religious, and political disputes which are of such long standing that the people themselves do not understand them. The same applies to the present civil war, or wars being waged by the various factions. In the case of the forces of Marshal Tito and General Mihailovich, both sides tell exactly the same stories of incidents which occurred at certain places on the same dates, the only difference being that each side places the blame on the other.

Both sides proclaim as their aim a Free, United and Democratic Yugoslavia with a form of government determined by a free electorate of the people after the country has been freed of the occupier. ...

In all of this welter of confusion, of conflicting reports and misunderstandings, a few pertinent facts stand out:

1. The vast majority of the people in Yugoslavia, ..., are neither Right, Left, Communist, Reactionary, or anything else. They are a simple peasant type of people, strong willed, hot blooded, with tremendous powers of endurance and great personal courage. ...
2. These people quite unique in Europe, have the will and the environment with which to effectively fight the enemy. Despite the confused state of their affairs they have caused him great difficulty and have killed large numbers of his troops. ...
3. The senseless killing of these people by each other must be stopped. It is useless now to endeavor to decide which side first did wrong. ...
4. It does not seem to me that the Allies have done well in Yugoslavia. We have never presented a united front to them. I have always believed in Allied cooperation, that there should have been one Military Mission composed of duly constituted high-ranking officers of at least Great Britain, and the Soviet Union, and the United States, who could have called all the conflicting parties together and taken such steps as were necessary in the form of a provisional government and military command to the end that the civil war was stopped and the maximum effort directed against the enemy. I have always opposed, as far as possible independent missions of the various Allies and have always worked to present at least an Anglo-American front to the Partisans.

5. In all this terrible story of misguidance, of rape and death and destruction, the one great power that I feel might have prevented it, or have stopped it, has never been used. The United States of America is mentioned in the same breath with God in Yugoslavia. We were the one nation on earth to whom the people believed they could turn for unbiased, unpolitical aid and advice without having to pay something in return. I am speaking now of the common man, not of Marshal Tito, General Mihailovich, or any one of the members of the government or the leaders of the various factions. ...

7. It is not now a question of whether the United States should send aid and representation to the Partisans. We have been sending them aid and have representation with them

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OPD
Memorandum/ Report
OPD 336 Yugoslavia Sec 1

July 8, 1944
General Marshall

Wm Donovan
Report on Yugoslavia

for a long time.

...
Nothing stated here should be construed as anti-British, anti-Russian, or anti-anythin
They are merely statements of facts intended to point out that we do have a very direct
interest in what is taking place in Yugoslavia. It does no good to say that we are not
interested in Yugoslavia and are not participating in the situation there, because we are,
in a most material and effective manner.

I, personally, do not feel that I can go on with the work in Yugoslavia unless I
can sincerely feel that every possible honest effort is being made to put an end to the
civil strife. ...

It is inconceivable that the combined strength and influence of the Soviet Union,
Great Britain, and the United States could not put an abrupt end to the civil wars in
Yugoslavia and guarantee the people a free electorate after the occupying troops have
withdrawn and the hot blood has cooled. That it has not been done is, in the eyes of
many, not a good portent for the future. The issues in Yugoslavia are ones which will have
to be faced in many parts of the world. The Yugoslavians with their wild, turbulent, strong
-willed nature, have abandoned Reason and resorted to Force. Is this the shape of the
things to come? Are we all of us sacrificing to end this war only to have dozens of little
wars spring up which may well merge into one gigantic conflict involving all mankind?

I posed the above questions in a report written last November. They are even more
apparent now. It appears to me that there are indications in the past few months that there
has been less emphasis placed on the fight against the enemy and more preparation for the
political struggle to follow the ending of the war. Under any conditions, two things stand
out-- every effort must be made to end the conflict among the people of Yugoslavia and
the United States has a very definite interest in seeing that it is ended as soon as
possible. This is furthermore a test of the ability of the United Nations, especially
the three Great Powers interested in the war in Europe, to cooperate unselfishly toward
a common end being that the people of Yugoslavia shall be free to select the form of
government and manner of living which the majority of them desire, free from undue external
political pressure and the fear of armed internal minorities."

L.M. Farish Lt Col AUS

Donovan submits to Handy for information./ Brief report to Gen Barker, Stewart, Briggs
Noted in North African section

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

GROUP 3
Downgraded at 12 year
interval;
automatically declassified

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9518

Secret

OPD

Letter

OPD 336 TS Section VI

William Donovan OSS

Intelligence teams in Balkans -

September 28, 1944

General Marshall

... , I cabled General Deane informing him that intelligence personnel was preparing to enter Bulgaria and other Balkan countries and requested that the Russians be informed and an arrangement made with them for exchange of information with their personnel in those areas. On 6 September General Deane replied that General Fitin, head of Russian intelligence, was taking the matter under consideration and that for the present believed it more desirable to carry out the exchange of intelligence in Moscow.

...
- "I do not need to urge upon you the necessity of sustaining the American position in Central Europe not only because of its effect upon our intelligence operations into Germany but to compel respect for the dignity of our country."

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OPD

Memorandum

OPD 336 TS Section VII

November 3, 1944

Gen Marshall

William Donovan OSS

Yugoslav Agreements

Noted and forwarded to G-2

Report that definite indications that Subasic has taken definite steps to carry out intention to establish a regency. ...

"We have also received from our representative in Belgrade a concurrent report concerning the Tito-Subasic agreement which is particularly interesting because it describes Subasic's own views toward the agreement.

'It is reported that Subasic and Tito have reached accord and are now drafting agreement. A combined government is envisaged.... We presume Tito will be Premier and will probably set up a device such as a regency to rule during the absence of the King and until a plebiscite is held on constitutional question. In the interim a constitutional monarch form of government would prevail.

I saw Subasic on 1 November and he is confirmed the data in paragraph one herein including regency set-up. Subasic said that Tito was very reasonable although urged by followers who are anxious to set-up a federated republic immediately. Subasic indicated the regency compromise agreement by Tito was only to obtain immediate recognition of United States and England. If this recognition is withheld I feel that the agreement might weaken.' "

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OPD

Memorandum

OPD 336 TS Section VIII

December 9, 1944

General Marshall

William Donovan OSS

OSS report from Belgrade Dec. 5, 1944

"In a lengthy conversation with the OSS Representative in Belgrade on 5 December, Subasic indicated that his visit to Moscow had been a difficult ordeal. Much time was spent discussing questions of government procedure pending a plebiscite, which Subasic feels will take place six months after the complete liberation of Yugoslavia. According to Subasic, Stalin insisted on the free expression of popular opinion in Yugoslavia, and expressed abhorrence of any Yugoslav 'experiments' in Communism or Bolshevism. Stalin appeared shocked to learn that some delegates to the Serb Congress (the Supreme Anti-Fascist Assembly of National Liberation of Serbia, held in mid-November 1944) were elected by acclaim, which he characterized as an undemocratic procedure.

Subasic reportedly admitted to British authorities in Belgrade that the return of King Peter was out of the question at present. ... He gave the impression that he intended to urge the King strongly to accept the Tito-Subasic agreement as the only means of preserving the monarchy, 'at least until the election of a constitutional assembly.' The OSS representative reports that there seems 'good reason to believe that unless Washington objects, the union of the two governments [the Tito administration and the Yugoslav Government-in-Exile] will shortly be accomplished.

The OSS representative in Belgrade comments that while Subasic probably did not expect Soviet support for the monarchy, he apparently went to Moscow to ascertain for himself what help he could expect from the USSR in maintaining a democratic Yugoslavia. Apparently the picture he received of Soviet democracy at work, taken with Stalin's protestations of support for democracy and free expression in Yugoslavia, raised some doubts in Subasic's mind as to whether they were talking about the same thing. The OSS representative doubts that the visit in any way modified the Tito-Subasic agreement; it simply modified Subasic's conception of the meaning of words. "

CC: CAD OPD G-2

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Chief of Staff

Memorandum

091 Russia

William Donovan OSS

Soviet capabilities and intentions

August 4, 1944

General Marshall

"With the defeat of Germany, the United States and the Soviet Union will become, and will long remain, by far the strongest nations in the world.

Because of the power position of the Soviet Union, it is indispensable that the American government should have accurate estimates of Soviet capabilities and intentions, and that those estimates should be constantly revised and kept up to date. Such estimates should be of particular value to the Joint Chiefs of Staff in planning for:

- (1) the later stages of the war with Japan;
- (2) the security aspects of the immediate post war settlement;
- (3) the long-term national defense of the United States.

The most fundamental aspects of Soviet capabilities and intentions are listed in the Annex.

For a long time the capabilities of the Soviet Union were a subject of detailed study in MIS, ONI and OSS. However it has now been many months since OSS has received any major request for reports on this subject from JIC, and it is believed that only limited attention is now being given to these matters in the service branches.

If the work on Soviet capabilities and intentions is given emphasis that corresponds to its very great importance, the qualified specialists of OSS in that field should be able to make a contribution of great value on these subjects, for the following reasons:

The group of this organization concerned with Russia's affairs includes 44 professional workers, of whom 33 were chiefly concerned for a very long period with the evaluation of Russian capabilities. ...

"We have already collected a great mass of documentary and printed material on Russia from American and overseas sources, and our staff have become familiar with much of the material in other agencies in Washington.

I bring this to your notice because of my belief that it is important to do now what may be badly needed later in our war with Japan."

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